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"He is the best of kings all the sources of whose income are managed and 
supervised by contented and trustworthy men well acquainted with the 
means of increasing the finances."                   Krishna Dwaipayan Vyas 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Indian legal frame compels the central bank of the country to increase money 
supply through financing fiscal deficits and thus fuels inflation, but, the 
liberalization of the economy has neutralized such inflationary potential. This 
chapter shows that the influence of such deficit financing on money stock 
became virtually nil during the post reform period, rather foreign exchange assets 
emerged as a powerful determinant of money stock.  
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1. Introduction 
Fiscal governance is a part of economic 
governance and is guided in India by the articles 
from 265 to 293 of the Constitution, which has no 
provision to control monetization of fiscal deficit 
through central bank credit1. In the Indian context 
during the pre reform period the Reserve Bank of 
India (the Bank henceforth) detected close 
correspondence between the money stock and 
the central budget deficit (CBD), which was quite 
indicative of inflation potential. Over three 
decades 1960s,’70s and ’80s CBD remained the 
single largest determinant of money stock. This 
relationship could be deemed as the result of 
making the Bank a statutory body subjected to 
legislative and executive governance instead of a 
Constitutional functionary like the Comptroller 
and Auditor General. It seems that sections 20 
and 30 of the Reserve Bank of India Act 1934 
(the RBIA henceforth) are responsible for deficit 
financing as well as the subordination of the Bank 
to the central government. On the one hand 
                                                 
1 Mitra et al (2000, p 351) 
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Section 20 of the RBIA empowers the central 
government to entrust the Bank with issue of new 
loans whereas on the other hand Section 30 
thereof provides the central government with the 
powers to supersede the Central Board of the 
Bank. Thus the Bank is not autonomous and is 
itself regulated by a player. Such non-autonomy 
can defeat the logics against the central bank 
independence as put forth by Rangarajan (1993) 
and go against article 39(a) in the case where 
fiscal deficit monetization bears inflationary 
potential2. This chapter tries to explore to what 
extent the non-autonomy of the Bank influences 
during the post reform period the relationship 
between M3 and CBD on the one hand and 
between RCG and CBD on the other. 
  
2. Literature review 
The elasticity of wholesale price index (WPI) with 
respect to the policy variable broad money (M3) 
is found to be unity in the long run3.  Evidences 
also exist of strong positive correlations during 
                                                 
2 Ramachandran (2000, p 3266) 
3 Singh et al (2005, p 182)  
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the pre reform period in India between money 
stock and CBD. For example in the early eighties 
the elasticity of money supply with respect to the 
CBD was found as high as 88%, whereas the 
elasticities with respect to other determinants like 
foreign exchange assets of the country and 
changes in commercial bank credit were much 
lower - 7% and 40% respectively4. Elasticity of y 
with respect to x means what % increase in y 
follows from every 1% increase in x.  Again in the 
late nineties the RBI credit to the central 
government (RCG) is found to push up M3 by 
more than 300% for every additional one rupee 
increment5. Finally, during the post reform period 
net foreign assets (in stead RCG) appeared to be 
strong determinants of M36. 
 
3. The issues 
a. How do CBD and RCG affect money stock? 
b. Is there any interdependence between RCG 
and CBD? 
                                                 
4 Sarma (1982, p 61) 
5 Rangrajan et al (1997, p 84) 
6 Soumya et al (2004-05, pp 91, 106-107) 
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4. Methodology 
This chapter tries to detect with the help of 
monthly data from 1998-99 to 2004-05 whether 
money supply is influenced by net foreign 
exchange assets of the country (NFEA), CBD 
and RBI credit to the government (RCG) with the 
help of two time series econometric models:  
(a) Single Equation Model - Linear regression of 
the logarithm of M3 is run on the logarithms of 
NFEA, CBD and RCG.  
(b) Simultaneous Equation Vector Autoregression 
(VAR) Model – Linear regressions of two 
endogenous variables CBD and RCG on each 
other with one lag, two lags, four lags and six 
lags.  
 
5. Source of data 
The data are taken from the RBI sources7. But it 
is difficult for the data available on these 
variables during the post reform period because 
CBD is occasionally found negative e.g. 
                                                 
7  Reserve Bank of India (2005, pp 305-314) 
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December 1994, September 1995, August 1996, 
December 1996, December 1997, August 2001 
and August 2002. Therefore what is permissible 
is to run regression of change in M3 on changes 
in CBD, NFEA and RCG. 
 
6. The single equation model 
With the help of above data the following 
relationship is estimated: 
∆M3 = 9076.345 – 0.089 ∆CBD + 0.314 ∆RCG + 
0.884 ∆NFEA 
           (8.29)          (-0.86)              (2.22)                 
(4.22)         R2 = 0.12                 (1) 
A meager t value of the ∆CBD coefficient 
suggests the dropping the variable to run 
regression of ∆M3 on ∆NFEA and ∆RCG. This is 
indicative of multicollinearity between ∆CBD and 
one of the rest two variables. The revised 
estimation is as follows: 
∆M3 = 9143.5 + 0.28 ∆RCG + 0.86 ∆NFEA 
               (8.37)          (2.06)              (4.14)                                 
R2 = 0.14                 (2) 
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Though t values improved in (2) relative to (1)R2 
did not improve much. It further suggests running 
regression of ∆M3 on ∆NFEA and ∆CBC 
individually. Individual regression of ∆M3 on 
∆RCG is not found insignificant in terms of both 
of t andR2 values whereas individual regression 
of ∆M3 on ∆NFEA is found relatively significant in 
the same terms. The regressions are given 
below: 
∆M3 = 11860.65 + 0.12 ∆RCG   
            (12.6)         (0.85)                                             
R2 = -0.002          (3) 
∆M3 = 9566.8 + 0.74 ∆NFEA 
            (8.8)       (3.7)                                    
R2 = 0.104            (4) 
 
In the post reform sample period CBD did not at 
all influence money stock, instead NFEA 
appeared to be a relatively important determinant 
of money stock. This is evident by the very poor 
values of t statistics of the CBD variable and R2 
in regression of ∆M3 on ∆CBD: 
 ∆M3 = 17073.15 - 0.12685 ∆CBD 
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            (11.35635)  (-1.00068)                     R2  = 
0.012212 
 
7. The VAR Model 
We verify the above conclusion with the help of a 
different model where we assume CBD and RCG 
are affecting each other. RCG a major source of 
M3 is taken as the proxy of M3. VAR model is a 
popular tool for this purpose. We considered 
three alternative VAR models – one lag, two lags, 
four lags and six lags. The results are given 
below: 
 
VAR (1 lag) 
CBDt = -3194.2+ 0.09 CBDt-1 + 0.07 RCGt-1               
(6) 
            (0.79)       (0.71)             (2.26) 
R2 = 0.74 Akaike AIC = 19.95, Schwarz SC = 
20.00 
RCGt = 7279.9 + 0.11 CBDt-1 + 0.94 RCGt-1                
(7) 
            (1.7)        (0.86)              (27.6) 
R2 = 0.92 Akaike AIC = 20, Schwarz SC = 20.00 
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VAR (2 lags) 
CBDt = - 2366.97 + 0.06 CBDt-1 + 0.252 CBDt-2 + 
0.076 RCGt-1 + 0.02 RCGt-2 
              (0.6)         (0.46)             (1.96)                
(0.62)                (0.16)    
  R2 = 0.1 Akaike AIC = 19.96, Schwarz SC = 
20.12 
RCGt = 7614.4 + 0.1 CBDt-1 + 0.06 CBDt-2 + 0.9 
RCGt-1 - 0.008 RCGt-2 
             (1.75)      (0.77)           (0.5)                
(7.3)             (0.06) 
R2 = 0.92 Akaike AIC = 20.07, Schwarz SC = 
20.23 
 
VAR (4 lags) 
CBDt = -3689.8 + 0.34 CBDt-1 + 0.29 CBDt-2 – 
0.069 CBDt-3 – 0.27 CBDt-4 +   
           (0.84)       (0.26)              (2.23)              
(0.05)              (1.9)                 
0.176 RCGt-1 – 0.11 RCGt-2 + 0.23 RCGt-3 – 0.22 
RCGt-4 
(1.4)                 (0.63)              (1.4)                (1.8) 
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R2 = 0.14 Akaike AIC = 19.99, Schwarz SC = 
20.28 
RCGt = 8226.29 + 0.07 CBDt-1 + 0.08 CBDt-2 + 
0.255 CBDt-3 – 0.065 CBDt-4 +  
            (1.75)        (0.5)                (0.6)                
(1.75)               (0.44) 
0.944 RCGt-1 – 0.2 RCGt-2 + 0.17 RCGt-3 + 0.006 
RCGt-4 
(6.9)                 (1.1)              (0.97)              (0.04) 
R2 = 0.91 Akaike AIC = 20.13, Schwarz SC = 
20.42 
 
VAR (6 lags) 
CBDt = - 6185.4 - 0.12 CBDt-1 + 0.23 CBDt-2 + 
0.02 CBDt-3 – 0.18 CBDt-4 – 0.32 CBDt-5  
              (1.33)     (0.8)               (1.7)                 
(0.14)              (1.2)               (2.3) 
– 0.24 CBDt-6 + 0.176 RCGt-1 + 0.035 RCGt-2 + 
0.2 RCGt-3 – 0.15 RCGt-4 – 0.11 RCGt-5  
  (1.7)                (0.9)                  (0.2)                 
(1.16)            (0.9)                 (0.66) 
+ 0.04 RCGt-6  
  (0.31) 
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R2 = 0.2 Akaike AIC = 19.97, Schwarz SC = 
20.4 
RCGt =10103.35 + 0.102 CBDt-1 + 0.08 CBDt-2 + 
0.315 CBDt-3 – 0.062 CBDt-4 – 0.171 CBDt-5 – 
0.03 CBDt-6 + 0.87 RCGt-1 – 0.18 RCGt-2 + 0.18 
RCGt-3 - 0.27 RCGt-4 + 0.28 RCGt-5 + 0.02 RCGt-6 
R2 = 0.92 Akaike AIC = 20.06, Schwarz SC = 
20.4 
 
We find that VAR (1 lag) consisting of equations 
6 and 7 gives the best result in terms of minimum 
values of Akaike AIC and Schwarz SC8. These 
equations show that RCG influences CBD in one 
period lag but not the reverse. This means the 
assurance of monetizing deficit given by the 
central bank encourages the government to be 
imprudent fiscally.   
 
8. Conclusion 
In above exercise it is found that in the post 
reform sample period the net foreign exchange 
assets of the economy instead of the central 
                                                 
8 Gujarati (2004, p 849) 
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government budget deficit (CBD) influenced 
money stock, but the RBI credit to central 
government influenced CBD at one period lag. 
This result, though obtained in a different frame, 
corroborates Soumya et al (2005).  
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